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We analyse the international transmission of interest rates by focusing on the role of the 
accumulation of international reserves and on the financing of sovereign debt. An increase in 
foreign exchange reserves is expected to moderate the influence of U.S. interest rates. However, 
a high level of government debt raises the sovereign risk premium. Moreover, an increase in 
the stock of government debt denominated in foreign currency may increase the expected rate 
of depreciation of the domestic currency. We explain the theoretical mechanisms in a model, 
which describes the money market equilibrium in an economy with capital account openness. 
Then, we test the predictions of the model for a panel of advanced and developing economies 
over the period 1970-2018. Our main findings are: i) significant spillovers from the U.S. interest 
rates to other countries, mostly for Advanced Economies; ii) a dampening effect of the share of 
external liabilities in the domestic currency, clearly a determinant of risk premium; iii) a 
negative effect of international reserves on interest rates, as expected; iv) higher reserves 
decrease risk premia, for long-term interest rates; v) the significance of spillovers fades once 
the sovereign debt reaches 100% of GDP in developed countries. 
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The prospect of a change in monetary policy in the United States (U.S.) matters for other 
countries, and this may be true whatever their exchange rate regime, if global financial flows 
have transformed the trilemma in international finance (fixed exchange rates, free capital flows, 
and independent monetary policy) into a dilemma (Rey, 2016). Moreover, other factors, which 
influence interest rates, may attenuate the international transmission of U.S. interest rates. In 
our paper, we focus on the role of government debt and on the role of international reserves.  
The level of government indebtedness has two opposite effects on domestic long-term 
interest rates. It has a positive effect since it influences risk premiums and sovereign bond yields 
typically upwards, and the latter can influence other interest rates in the economy. However, it 
can also have a negative impact if there is some indirect monetary financing of budget deficits, 
notably via quantitative easing measures, which expands the liquidity in the economy and 
lowers short-term interest rates. In addition, the accumulation of international reserves may 
reinforce this liquidity effect by increasing money supply.  
Therefore, our contribution is to verify whether the accumulation of reserve assets by central 
banks enable countries with a high level of government debt to keep interest rates low and to 
be less exposed to the global transmission of interest rate shocks. Hence, we first explain the 
theoretical mechanisms in a model, which describes the money market equilibrium in an 
economy with capital account openness. Then, we test empirically the predictions of the model 
for a panel of advanced and developing economies over the period 1970-2018. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review. 
Section 3 outlines the theoretical framework. Section 4 details the empirical strategy and 
discusses our results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Related literature 
The strength and determinants of international interest rate spillovers is a central issue in 
international economics. Notably, the standard textbook approach suggests that in a financially 
globalized world only floating exchange rates can ensure (some degree of) monetary 
independence (Mundell, 1963). This view, as noted in the introduction, has been recently 
challenged by Rey (2016). It seems, however, that the debate is far from being settled.  
Other theoretical frameworks shedding some light on the issue include the New-Keynesian 
approach. In such a setup, Farhi & Werning (2014) show that capital controls do not change 
significantly the reaction of interest rates, whereas under fixed exchange rate their behaviour is 
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strongly affected. However, they find that both capital controls and flexible exchange rates are 
useful to respond to sudden stops. Noteworthy, the Dominant Currency Paradigm (Gopinath et 
al., 2020) implies a high degree of interest rates’ synchronization. They also assume that the 
dollar interest rate in the country is an increasing function of its external debt (p. 690, note 9) – 
an issue that we will empirically explore in our study.  
Frankel et al. (2004) empirically tested international transmission of interest rates on a 
sample of 46 countries observed over 1970-1999. Utilizing a static panel data analysis they find 
that in most cases full transmission cannot be rejected (coefficient not significantly different 
from 1). Their point estimates are located between 0.53-0.64 except for managed floating with 
a lower and insignificant value of 0.17. However, the differences in slope coefficients are not 
significant, but differences in constants are (indicating higher risk premia in the floating 
countries). Furthermore, utilizing Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) models for 
individual countries, they find that interest rates of countries with floating exchange rate 
regimes adjust more slowly.  
In an alternative (but comparable) approach, Shambaugh (2004) focuses on interest rates’ 
changes in an even larger panel of 155 countries over roughly the same post-Bretton Woods 
period (1973-2000). He finds that the elasticity of spillover is of roughly 0.5 for fixed exchange 
rate regime and of roughly 0.3 for non-pegged economies (p. 303). Additionally, both fixed 
exchange rates and open capital markets increase the responsiveness to the base interest rate.” 
(p. 304). The relationship is also the strongest for the pegs without capital controls (0.67, even 
higher for 1990s), then non-pegs without capital controls (0.56), pegged with capital controls 
(0.41) and non-pegged with capital controls (0.15, insignificant). Moreover, under the dynamic 
ARDL specifications Shambaugh (2004) confirms that the pegs adjust more quickly. 
Di Giovanni & Shambaugh (2008), while explaining channels of influence of foreign rates on 
the domestic economy find that 36% of the base interest rate is transmitted to pegged countries. 
However, they differentiate between 10 different base countries to which implicitly or 
explicitly the other currencies are linked. All these empirical studies find a relatively sound 
support of the Mundellian trilemma and a high(er) degree of pass-through in the pegged 
countries. At the same time, none of them considers explicitly the role of government debt nor 
international reserves as possible determinants of such a pass-through. 
More recently, Han & Wei (2018) estimate a variant of a differenced Taylor rule, augmented 
by monetary spillovers from the US (further divided into four cases depending on the exchange 
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rate regime1 and existence of capital controls), inertia (or “momentum”) parameter and the VIX 
(also in first difference). Monetary policy spillovers turn out to be asymmetrical: peripheral 
countries enjoy monetary autonomy under floating exchange rates and without capital controls 
but only when the US tightens their monetary policy stance. A monetary easing in the US, 
however, forces them to cut interest rates, too (in a “fear of appreciation”). Thus, they argue in 
favour of a 2.5-lemma (or an intermediate state between a trilemma and a dilemma). 
Additionally, capital controls allow for monetary autonomy under either of exchange rate 
regimes.  
Focusing on 43 emerging economies between 1983 and 2013, Obstfeld et al. (2019) find that 
the trilemma holds in the following sense: fixed and intermediate regimes provide less 
insulation from the global financial shocks. However, the American interest rates do not show 
any significant impact on the GDP or credit growth, net capital flows nor stock returns. 
Nevertheless, the question of interest rate transmission was not studied directly.  
In an attempt to gauge the impact of the third element of the trilemma – free flows of capital, 
Bekaert & Mehl (2019), utilizing a two-factor (global – local) model, assess long-term 
evolutions of international financial integration and find a “swoosh” shape. Then, in the spirit 
of Obstfeld et al. (2005), they estimate the incidence of American interest rates on the other 
countries but augment this equation with their financial globalization measure and the exchange 
rate system. Overall, the pass-through coefficient is estimated at 0.3, but it assumes the highest 
value of 0.56 for the post-Bretton Woods era. The remainder of their results suggest that the 
trilemma holds, as the peg decreases interest rates spillovers, and more financial openness 
increases – especially for the non-floaters. Bekaert & Mehl (2019) also explicitly consider the 
quantitative easing period and again find some evidence of asymmetric transmission (or 2.5-
lemma).  
An explicit consideration to international transmission of unconventional monetary policy 
(here in case of the ECB to Poland) is given by Janus (2020). He studies spillovers in mean and 
in variance to interest rates and exchange rates via a VAR-GARCH-DCC model as well as 
event studies, and finds at best modest spillovers, possibly due to the free-floating regime in 
Poland.  
Among the newest noteworthy approaches to the problem of international monetary 
transmission, one is based on spillovers from implied Fed-induced surprises to bond markets 
(Albagli et al., 2019; Gilchrist et al., 2019) and the other based on meta-analysis evaluating 
                                                 
1 They utilize de facto classification of exchange rates by Ilzetzki et al., (2019).  
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international spillovers from both conventional and unconventional monetary policy to 
banking-sector lending rates (Buch et al., 2019). While the latter is based on a large international 
collaboration of central bank teams and utilizes micro-level (partially confidential) data and the 
former relies on the monetary shocks estimated from a very short-term horizon changes in the 
yields around policy meetings – both find significant spillovers from the US and other monetary 
policy rates. Overall, it seems that the debate over the mechanisms of the transmission of U.S. 
interest rates to other economies has not been definitively settled and that the evidence of the 
role of public debt and international reserves is scarce. We aim to fill-in this gap. 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
We extend the model in Edwards and Khan (1985) in such a way that we are able to 
distinguish the effects of international reserves and those of government debt on interest rates. 
They proposed a model of interest rate determination in an economy with capital account 
openness. Domestic interest rates are influenced by foreign factors (via the interest rate parity) 
depending on the degree of the capital account openness. They are also dependent on domestic 
monetary conditions (via the Fisher equation). The model describes the money market 
equilibrium whereby the real interest rate is influenced by a liquidity effect (it deviates from its 
long run equilibrium level if there is an excess supply of money). We amend this model by 
adding the role of international reserves and the presence of government debt. Thus, we modify 
the specification of the interest rate parity and of the money supply: 
- we define the expected rate of change of the exchange rate as a function of international 
reserves; 
- we add a risk premium (sovereign default) in the interest rate parity; 
- we define the risk premium as a function of the level of government debt; 
- we introduce monetary financing of budget deficits in the model by specifying the 
counterparts of money supply. 
 
The nominal interest rate at time t, 𝑖𝑡, is specified as follows: 
 
𝑖𝑡 = 𝜓(𝑖𝑡
∗ + ?̇?𝑡 + 𝑧𝑡) + (1 − 𝜓)(𝑟𝑡 + 𝜋𝑡
𝑒)                                                     (1) 
 
where 𝑖𝑡
∗ is the foreign (U.S.) interest rate, ?̇?𝑡 the expected rate of depreciation of the domestic 
currency, (the exchange rate is defined as a direct quotation for foreign currency: one unit of 
foreign currency in terms of units of domestic currency), 𝑧𝑡 the country risk premium, 𝑟𝑡 the 
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real interest rate, 𝜋𝑡
𝑒  the expected inflation rate, and 𝜓 a parameter, which measures the degree 
of the country financial openness (capital account). The first component of Eq. (1) represents 
the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) and the second component the Fisher equation.  
The domestic interest rate responds with a delay to any changes in the expected return of 
foreign financial assets. This may be due to transaction costs, information lags or any other kind 
of frictions. Hence, we have: Δ𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃[(𝑖𝑡
∗ + ?̇?𝑡 + 𝑧𝑡) − 𝑖𝑡−1], where Δ is the first difference 
operator, and 𝜃 the adjustment parameter (0 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 1). It follows: 
 
 𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃(𝑖𝑡
∗ + ?̇?𝑡 + 𝑧𝑡) + (1 − 𝜃)𝑖𝑡−1.                                                     (2) 
 
The real interest rate is influenced by a liquidity effect. It deviates from its (constant) long-
term equilibrium level, 𝜌, if there is any excess money supply (𝐸𝑀𝑆 > 0) in the money market: 
 
𝑟𝑡 = 𝜌 − 𝜆𝐸𝑀𝑆𝑡 + 𝜔𝑡        (3)   
 
where 𝜆 is a parameter (𝜆 > 0) and 𝜔𝑡 an error term.  
 The excess money supply is defined as: 
 
𝐸𝑀𝑆𝑡 = 𝑚𝑡 − 𝑚𝑡
𝑑                     (4) 
   
where 𝑚𝑡 is the actual stock of real money and 𝑚𝑡
𝑑 the desired equilibrium stock of real money 
balances. The equilibrium demand for money is specified in a standard manner (narrow 
aggregate). The long-run demand for money is assumed to be a function of real income 𝑦𝑡, the 
long-term equilibrium nominal interest rate (𝜌 + 𝜋𝑡
𝑒) rather than the current nominal interest 




𝑑 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑦𝑡 − 𝛼2(𝜌 + 𝜋𝑡
𝑒) − 𝛼3𝜋𝑡
𝑒.                  (5)   
 
As for money supply, the stock adjusts according to the following mechanism: Δ𝑚𝑡 =
𝛽(𝑚𝑡
𝑑 − 𝑚𝑡−1), where β is the adjustment coefficient (0 < 𝛽 < 1). This process allows the 
nominal interest rate to return eventually to its long-term equilibrium level. It can also be written 
as: 
                                                 





𝑑 + (1 − 𝛽)𝑚𝑡−1.                                        (6)  
  
International reserves and government debt are incorporated into the model through 
monetary conditions and the interest rate parity.  
 The effect of money supply 𝑚𝑡 on the interest rate can be specified through the 
counterparts of money supply: domestic assets (𝑎𝑡) and international reserves (𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡). 
Domestic assets, in turn, are decomposed into loans to the private sector (𝑙𝑡) and loans 
to the general government (𝑏𝑡). Indeed, a share of domestic loans is used to finance 
budget deficits. Government debt can be either in local currency (𝑏𝑡
𝐿𝐶) or in foreign 
currency (𝑏𝑡
𝐹𝐶).3  
 The expected rate of depreciation of the domestic currency is a negative function of 
international reserves and a positive function of government debt denominated in 
foreign currency. The country risk premium, 𝑧𝑡, is a positive function of overall 
government debt as long as a higher level of government debt increases the probability 
of sovereign default (Afonso et al., 2018; Bi, 2012).4 Therefore, we can write:  
  
?̇?𝑡 = 𝛿0 − 𝛿1𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝛿2𝑏𝑡−1
𝐹𝐶  ,                                      (7) 
 
𝑧𝑡 = 𝜇0 + 𝜇1𝑏𝑡−1.                                                             (8) 
 
We can finally derive the reduced-form equation for the nominal interest rate by combining 
Equations (2)-(8): 
 
𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾2𝑖𝑡
∗ + 𝛾3𝑦𝑡 + 𝛾4𝜋𝑡
𝑒 + 𝛾5𝑙𝑡−1 + 𝛾6𝑏𝑡−1
𝐿𝐶 + 𝛾7𝑏𝑡−1
𝐹𝐶 + 𝛾8𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝑡   (9)  
 
with  
𝛾0 = 𝜓𝜃(𝛿0 + 𝜇0) + (1 − 𝜓)[𝜌 + 𝜆(1 − 𝛽)(𝛼0 − 𝛼2𝜌)] 
𝛾1 = 𝜓(1 − 𝜃) 
                                                 
3 Similarly, loans to the private sector can be denominated in local currency (𝑙𝑡
𝐿𝐶) and in foreign currency (𝑙𝑡
𝐹𝐶).  
4 One can further consider that countries with independent monetary policies, and with a de facto national central 
bank as lender of last resort, can provide additional guarantee that the sovereign bonds of these countries face 




𝛾2 = 𝜓𝜃  
𝛾3 = (1 − 𝜓)𝜆(1 − 𝛽)𝛼1 
𝛾4 = (1 − 𝜓)[1 − 𝜆(1 − 𝛽)(𝛼2 + 𝛼3)] 
𝛾5 = −(1 − 𝜓)𝜆(1 − 𝛽) 
𝛾6 = 𝜓𝜃𝜇1 − (1 − 𝜓)𝜆(1 − 𝛽) 
𝛾7 = 𝜓𝜃(𝛿2 + 𝜇1) − (1 − 𝜓)𝜆(1 − 𝛽) 
𝛾8 = −𝜓𝜃𝛿1 − (1 − 𝜓)𝜆(1 − 𝛽) 
 
and 𝑡 = (1 − 𝜓)𝜔𝑡. 
 
With immediate adjustment to UIP, the lagged value of the nominal interest rate would 
disappear from Equation (9): 𝜃 = 1 and 𝛾1 = 0. The international transmission of interest rates 
is captured by the composite parameter 𝛾2 > 0. An increase in real income is expected to cause 
a rise in domestic interest rates (𝛾3 > 0) whereas credit growth to the private sector expands 
liquidity in the economy and has a negative effect on interest rates (𝛾5 < 0). The effect of 
inflation expectations (𝛾4) is positive if 𝜆(1 − 𝛽)(𝛼2 + 𝛼3) < 1. It depends in particular on 
how money demand is affected by inflation expectations (𝛼2 and 𝛼3).  
The effect of government debt on domestic interest rates is ambiguous (sign of parameters 
𝛾6 and 𝛾7) because there are two opposite effects. Indeed, there is a positive effect (first part of 
the parameters) through the risk premium and the expected rate of depreciation of the domestic 
currency, and there is a negative effect (second part of the parameters) because domestic 
banking loans to the public sector increase liquidity in the economy. In short, an increase in 
sovereign indebtedness can lead to a rise of interest rates in the economy via a “premium effect” 
or a decline of interest rates via a “liquidity effect”. The premium effect is stronger when 
government debt is denominated in foreign currency (𝛾7 > 𝛾6). In contrast, an increase in 
international reserves has an unambiguously negative effect on domestic interest rates (𝛾8). 
This influence is reduced though in situations with sterilized central bank interventions in 
foreign exchange market.5 
 
 
                                                 
5 Depending on the extent of sterilized interventions, 𝜆(1 − 𝛽) is close to zero and as a result, the size of the 
parameter 𝛾8 is reduced to a value close to −𝜓𝜃𝛿1. 
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4. Empirical strategy and analysis 
4.1. Empirical strategy and data  
We estimate the model described by Equation (9). The dependent variable 𝑖𝑡 is the short-
term interest rate (3-month market rate) or in an alternative specification the long-term interest 
rate (10-year sovereign bond yield). The foreign interest rate 𝑖𝑡
∗ is the U.S. interest rate (the 
federal funds rate, and in alternative specifications, the 3-month Treasury bill rate and the 10-
year sovereign yield). Real income 𝑦𝑡 is measured by the real GDP growth rate. Loans to the 
private sector 𝑙𝑡 are represented by the ratio of credit to the private sector to GDP.  
Government debt (𝑏𝑡) is measured by general government debt as a percentage of GDP (or 
central government debt for some countries). We use the IMF Global Debt Database (Mbaye, 
Moreno-Badia and Chae, 2018). The theoretical model makes a distinction between 
government debt denominated in local currency and government debt denominated in foreign 
currency. Unfortunately, due to issues of data availability, we cannot make this distinction in 
the empirical analysis. Still, in robustness checks, we propose to test the influence of external 
debt liabilities in domestic currency and in foreign currency by using the dataset built by 
Bénétrix, Lane and Shambaugh (2015), which has been recently updated and extended to a 
larger sample of countries and a longer time span by Bénétrix et al. (2019). As for international 
reserves (𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡), we use IFS data from the IMF about reserve assets. They are expressed in U.S. 
dollars. We compute them in domestic currency as a percentage of GDP.  
The constant term 𝛾0 in Eq. (9) includes the constant term of the risk premium 𝜇0. From an 
empirical viewpoint, we can add a random term in the formulation of the risk premium, and this 
term can be a part of the error term 𝑡. To account for various time-varying factors of the risk 
premium, which can be domestic or global risk factors, we alternatively use for robustness 
checks the role of global uncertainty (VIX). The degree of financial openness is measured by 
the Chinn-Ito index, KAOPEN (Chinn & Ito, 2006). 
While testing the overall predictions of the model presented in section 3, we specifically 
focus on the transmission of the American interest rates as determined or moderated by three 
main factors of our interest: (fixed) exchange rate regime, level of public debt (as share of GDP) 
and the abundance of reserves (in log). More specifically, we utilize the exchange rate 
arrangement classification by Ilzetzki et al. (2019), and, as a robustness check, the one proposed 
more recently by Dąbrowski et al. (2020) In the former case as the dummy for fixed exchange 
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rate arrangement we utilize the category 1 of the “coarse” classification6 and in the latter – their 
“fixed” category. 
To uncover the mechanisms of transmission of the American interest rate depending on the 
exchange rate regime and the level of public debt to GDP, we estimate the coefficient on each 
of these three variables as well as their interactions. If the interaction term between the debt-to-
GDP and the US interest rate turns significant, we additionally report the average marginal 
effects by thresholds of 20% of debt-to-GDP ratio and generally find that the significance fades 
once the indebtedness indicator reaches 100% of GDP.  
We also compare the results for the subsamples of advanced and developing economies.  
 
4.2. Empirical Results 
As discussed above, and similarly to Frankel et al. (2004) we concentrate on the level of 
short-term and long-term interest rates (denoted, respectively 𝑖𝑡
𝑆 and 𝑖𝑡
𝐿) to assess empirically 
the model via the estimation of several alternative versions of equation (9). Thus, the set of 
independent variables we consider in the following estimates includes: 
𝑖𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑆  or 𝑖𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐿  – respectively short-term or long-term rates lagged one period 
𝑖𝑖,𝑡
𝑆_𝑈𝑆 or 𝑖𝑖,𝑡
𝐿_𝑈𝑆 – respectively short-term or long-term US interest rates at time t 
𝐼𝑅𝑅_1𝑖,𝑡 – dummy variable denoting a fixed exchange rate regime in Ilzetzki et al. (2019) 
“coarse” classification 
ln 𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡 – natural logarithm of foreign exchange reserves in USD at time t 
𝑑𝑖,𝑡 – ratio of public debt to GDP at time t 
𝑝𝑐𝑖,𝑡 – credit to private sector at time t 
𝜋𝑖,𝑡
𝑒  – inflation expectations in the current period 
𝜋𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑒  – inflation expectations in the previous period 
𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑖,𝑡– value of CBOE volatilility index at time t 
𝑔𝑖,𝑡 – real GDP growth rate  
𝑘𝑎𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑖,𝑡 – value of Chinn-Ito index at time t 
𝑘𝑎𝑖,𝑡 – capital controls - overall restrictions index, all asset categories 
𝑘𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡– capital controls - overall inflow restrictions index 
𝑘𝑎𝑜𝑖,𝑡 – capital controls - overall outflow restrictions index 
                                                 
6 We have also tested a dummy covering both categories 1 and 2 of the classification, with qualitatively similar, 
but generally weaker, results. These robustness checks are available upon request.  
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𝐹𝐷𝑖,𝑡 – financial development (findev) index from Svirydzenka (2016)  
𝑒𝑙_𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 – share of external liabilities denominated in foreign currencies  
𝑒𝑙_𝑔𝑑𝑝_𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 – relation of external liabilities denominated in foreign currency to GDP 
𝑒𝑙_𝑔𝑑𝑝_𝐷𝐶𝑖,𝑡 – relation of external liabilities denominated in domestic currency to GDP (the 
three last variables related to external liabilities come from Bénétrix et al., 2019). 
 
Therefore, we have estimated six main specifications both for short- (S) and long-term (L) 
interest rates with variations in the definitions of the explanatory and control variables:  
 
1. 𝑖𝑖,𝑡
𝑇 = 𝑐 +  𝛽0𝑖𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑇 + 𝛽1 ln 𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑝𝑐𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝜋𝑖,𝑡
𝑒 + 𝛽5𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑖,𝑡+𝛽6𝐹𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑘𝑎𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽8𝐼𝑅𝑅_1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑖𝑖,𝑡
𝑇_𝑈𝑆 + 𝛽10𝐼𝑅𝑅_1𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑖𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑈𝑆 + 𝛽11𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐼𝑅𝑅1𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑖𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑈𝑆 ∗ 𝑑𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽14𝐼𝑅𝑅1𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑖𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑈𝑆 ∗ 𝑑𝑖,𝑡 with 𝑇 = 𝑆, 𝐿  
2. 𝑖𝑖,𝑡
𝑇 = 𝑐 +  𝛽0𝑖𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑇 + 𝛽1 ln 𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑝𝑐𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝜋𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑒 + 𝛽5𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑖,𝑡+𝛽6𝐹𝐷𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽7𝑘𝑎𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑅𝑅_1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑖𝑖,𝑡
𝑇_𝑈𝑆 + 𝛽10𝐼𝑅𝑅_1𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑖𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑈𝑆 + 𝛽11𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐼𝑅𝑅1𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑖𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑈𝑆 ∗
𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽14𝐼𝑅𝑅1𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑖𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑈𝑆 ∗ 𝑑𝑖,𝑡 with 𝑇 = 𝑆, 𝐿 
3. 𝑖𝑖,𝑡
𝑇 = 𝑐 +  𝛽0𝑖𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑇 + 𝛽1𝑒𝑙_𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑝𝑐𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝜋𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑒 + 𝛽5𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑖,𝑡+𝛽6𝐹𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑘𝑎𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽8𝐼𝑅𝑅_1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑖𝑖,𝑡
𝑇_𝑈𝑆 + 𝛽10𝐼𝑅𝑅_1𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑖𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑈𝑆 + 𝛽11𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐼𝑅𝑅1𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑖𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑈𝑆 ∗ 𝑑𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽14𝐼𝑅𝑅1𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑖𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑈𝑆 ∗ 𝑑𝑖,𝑡 with 𝑇 = 𝑆, 𝐿 
4. 𝑖𝑖,𝑡
𝑇 = 𝑐 +  𝛽0𝑖𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑇 + 𝛽1𝑒𝑙_𝑔𝑑𝑝_𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑒𝑙_𝑔𝑑𝑝_𝐷𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑝𝑐𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝜋𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑒 +
𝛽6𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑖,𝑡+𝛽7𝐹𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑘𝑎𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐼𝑅𝑅_1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑖𝑖,𝑡
𝑇_𝑈𝑆 + 𝛽11𝐼𝑅𝑅_1𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑖𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑈𝑆 + 𝛽12𝑑𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽13𝐼𝑅𝑅1𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽14𝑖𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑈𝑆 ∗ 𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽15𝐼𝑅𝑅1𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑖𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑈𝑆 ∗ 𝑑𝑖,𝑡 with 𝑇 = 𝑆, 𝐿 
5. 𝑖𝑖,𝑡
𝑇 = 𝑐 +  𝛽0𝑖𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑇 + 𝛽1 ln 𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑝𝑐𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝜋𝑖,𝑡
𝑒 + 𝛽5𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑖,𝑡+𝛽6𝐹𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑘𝑎𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽8𝐼𝑅𝑅_1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑖𝑖,𝑡
𝑇_𝑈𝑆 + 𝛽10𝐼𝑅𝑅_1𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑖𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑈𝑆 + 𝛽11𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐼𝑅𝑅1𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑖𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑈𝑆 ∗ 𝑑𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽14𝐼𝑅𝑅1𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑖𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑈𝑆 ∗ 𝑑𝑖,𝑡 with 𝑇 = 𝑆, 𝐿 
6. 𝑖𝑖,𝑡
𝑇 = 𝑐 +  𝛽0𝑖𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑇 + 𝛽1 ln 𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑝𝑐𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝜋𝑖,𝑡
𝑒 + 𝛽5𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑖,𝑡+𝛽6𝐹𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑘𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽8𝑘𝑎𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐼𝑅𝑅_1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑖𝑖,𝑡
𝑇_𝑈𝑆 + 𝛽11𝐼𝑅𝑅_1𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑖𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑈𝑆 + 𝛽12𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐼𝑅𝑅1𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽14𝑖𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑈𝑆 ∗
𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽15𝐼𝑅𝑅1𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑖𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑈𝑆 ∗ 𝑑𝑖,𝑡 with 𝑇 = 𝑆, 𝐿 
 
In addition, we used different estimation methods: OLS pooled with robust SE (Table 1); 
PCSE pooled (Table 2); Driscoll-Kraay SE pooled (Table 3). In standard OLS estimations, there 
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are three panel error assumptions: groupwise heteroskedasticity, contemporaneous correlation, 
and serial correlation. The PCSE method only corrects for the first two. In the Driscoll and 
Kraay (1998) robust estimation, the error structure is assumed to be heteroskedastic, 
autocorrelated up to some lag (in this case 2 years), and possibly correlated between the groups 
(panels). Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are robust to very general forms of cross-sectional 
("spatial") and temporal dependence when the time dimension becomes large. This 
nonparametric technique of estimating standard errors does not place any restrictions on the 
limiting behaviour of the number of panels. 
Tables 1, 2 and 3 present the estimated coefficients for the short-term rates in whole panel 
of up to 53 countries (regressions 1 – 6). Table 4 shows a comparison of estimates of regression 
1 for advanced and developing economies with the three alternative methods we utilize. Tables 
5, 6 and 7 report the corresponding results for the case of long-term interest rates (10-year 
government bond yields) in advanced economies, whereas tables 8, 9 and 10 include the results 
of estimates for developing countries, for which long-term rates are taken from JP Morgan 







The results can be summarized as follows:  
- the interest rates are very persistent, as observed in the first lag of the dependent variable 
with the order of value of 0.55 to 0.7;  
- there are important direct spillovers from the U.S. interest rates to advanced economies, 
but not to developing countries (as evidenced in Table 4), which also makes the 
transmission not robustly significant for the whole panel of countries (Tables 1 – 3);  
- Private credit to GDP tends to reduce interest rates, thus confirming a prediction of the 
model (𝛾5 < 0);  
- Inflation expectations (especially the formed at the current period) robustly increase the 
nominal interest rates – which is in line general economic intuition and possible within 
our model (𝛾4 turns out to be positive); 
- The estimated coefficient for economic growth has the expected positive sign only for 
advanced economies (Table 4); does not seem to impact the level of short-term interest 
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rates in the whole panel (Tables 1-3) and exhibits even paradoxical sign once long-term 
rates are considered both in advanced and developing economies; 
- Global volatility index (VIX) is a significantly robust determinant long-term rates in 
developing countries (Tables 8-10), confirming the intuition that in more turbulent times 
the capital flights to safer bays; 
- Financial openness measures (kaopen, ka, kai, kao) exert a dampening effect on interest 
rates, although with a varying strength and significance in different specifications; 
- Financial development allows for lowering short term rates (Tables 1-3); 
- Composition of external liabilities plays a significant role for both short-term and long-
term rates - countries with higher shares of liabilities denominated in foreign currencies 
(a risk factor) exhibit higher interest rates, which is also in line with predictions of the 





Turning to our main variables of interest, reserves and public debt as well as its interactions 
with the exchange rate arrangement and the American interest rates, we can note that:  
- The coefficient on foreign reserves is indeed negative and significant (the model 
predicted 𝛾8 < 0), but only in case of long-term rates in developed countries (Tables 5-
7); 
- Up to 0.35 of the U.S. impulses are passed through to or short term rates in the whole 
sample (Tables 1-3), in the specifications with composition of external liabilities, the 
effect can be seen by the interaction term with the fixed exchange rate dummy meaning 
that the transmission occurs in the countries having their currencies anchored. On the 
other hand, Table 4 demonstrates that the pass-through of short-term rates happens only 
in developed countries; 
- Transmission of long-term rates is much stronger for the developed economies and in 
the long-run: as illustrated in Tables 5-7 the pass-through coefficient is always 
significant and varies between 0.47 and 0.73. The effect is further strengthened in 
countries with fixed exchange rates. Contrarily to advanced economies, in developing 




- The fixed exchange rate dummy (exchange rate arrangement denoted by “1” in the 
“coarse” classification by Ilzetzki et al. 2019) may help to lower short-term rates (Tables 
1-3, regressions 3-4), however, for developing countries the effect seems to be 
paradoxical both for short-term (Table 4) and long-term rates (Tables 8 and 10).  
- Public debt has directly only a limited and not robust positive effect on interest rates 
(long, short and in all sub-samples), which might be implied by the two opposing effects 
(risk and liquidity) cancelling out each other. However, interacted with the US interest 
rate public debt reveals some interesting moderating role. For the instances, in which 
this coefficient turned out significant (notably regressions 3 and 4 for long-term rates in 
the developed economies – Tables 5 and 6) we estimate the marginal effects (Table 11). 
It turns out that at a low level of public debt ratios the US long-term rates are 
significantly passed-through. However, for a debt-to-GDP ratio of 80%, the effect 
vanishes and for the most indebted countries, the relation might be even inversed. We 
interpret this as a sign that excessive public debt effectively excludes a country from 
international financial markets or at least forces it to borrow at a different level of 







In this paper, we study the determinants of international transmission of interest rates with a 
special emphasis on the role of international reserves and government debt. We confirm that 
the trilemma still holds, although a true monetary independence is only achieved through capital 
controls.  
While testing predictions of our theoretical model we notably find that the government debt 
can have a liquidity effect on short-term rates (leading to their reduction), but for the long-term 
rates the net effect is nil or the opposite effects of liquidity and risk cancel out each other. A 
higher level of international reserves can help to reduce long-term interest rates.  
Summarising we find: i) significant spillovers from the U.S. interest rates to other countries; 
ii) a dampening effect of the share of external liabilities in the domestic currency, clearly a 
determinant of risk premium; iii) a negative effect of international reserves on interest rates, as 
expected; iv) higher reserves decrease risk premia, for long-term interest rates; v) the spillover 
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effect of the US interest rate is mostly significant for the Advanced Economies sub-group; and 
vi) the significance of this effect fades once the sovereign debt reaches 100% of GDP. 
As main directions for further research we may point out a more in-depth exploration of the 
risk and liquidity channels of public debt with a possible estimation of the threshold of public 
debt-to-GDP ratio above which the sign of the effect of the public debt variable on interest rates 
changes. Finally, future work could also use error-correction models to uncover the underlying 
dynamics of interest rates adjustment. 
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Table 1: Transmission of short-term rates – all countries, pooled OLS with robust SE 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
L.st_intrate 0.613*** 0.707*** 0.665*** 0.674*** 0.631*** 0.630*** 
 (0.066) (0.077) (0.091) (0.089) (0.067) (0.067) 
lnreserves -0.014 -0.014   0.105 0.112 
 (0.083) (0.080)   (0.078) (0.077) 
privcredit_gdp -0.004 -0.004 -0.009* -0.008* -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
gdpgrowth -0.065 -0.059 -0.115 -0.115 -0.085 -0.083 
 (0.080) (0.091) (0.121) (0.122) (0.082) (0.082) 
infexp_current 0.154  0.108 0.108 0.133 0.133 
 (0.102)  (0.101) (0.101) (0.096) (0.096) 
vix -0.022 -0.016 -0.024 -0.022 -0.028 -0.027 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) 
kaopen -0.054 -0.156 -0.206 -0.178   
 (0.108) (0.139) (0.162) (0.156)   
findev -0.806 -1.444** 1.122* 0.625 -1.705** -1.855** 
 (0.747) (0.702) (0.689) (0.679) (0.749) (0.736) 
irr_dummy_1 0.042 -0.286 -0.765* -0.805** 0.015 0.093 
 (0.552) (0.594) (0.402) (0.405) (0.528) (0.537) 
publicdebt_gdp -0.001 -0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) 
irr_dummy_1#publicdebt_gdp -0.010 -0.006 0.002 0.000 -0.011 -0.012 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) 
st_intrate_US 0.207 0.186 0.108 0.111 0.338** 0.347** 
 (0.144) (0.143) (0.093) (0.095) (0.135) (0.135) 
irr_dummy_1#st_intrate_US -0.112 -0.032 0.373** 0.351** -0.001 -0.003 
 (0.193) (0.195) (0.145) (0.142) (0.174) (0.174) 
publicdebt_gdp#st_intrate_US -0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
irr_dummy_1#publicdebt_gdp#st
_intrate_US 
0.003 0.002 -0.003 -0.002 0.003 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
infexp_previous  -0.052     
  (0.119)     
share_extL_FC   1.220*    
   (0.709)    
extL_DC_gdp    -0.000   
    (0.001)   
extL_FC_gdp    0.002   
    (0.002)   
ka     -0.656*  
     (0.367)  
kai      -1.070 
      (0.727) 
kao      0.223 
      (0.605) 
Constant 2.458* 3.243** 1.296 1.919* 2.006* 1.954 
 (1.264) (1.265) (0.944) (1.118) (1.239) (1.234) 
       
Observations 586 585 493 493 537 537 
R-squared 0.827 0.811 0.852 0.851 0.837 0.837 
r2_a 0.823 0.806 0.847 0.846 0.832 0.832 
F 76.034 74.807 69.256 65.447 72.560 68.058 




Table 2: Transmission of short term rates – all countries, PCSE pooled  
 
VARIABLES (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
L.st_intrate 0.542*** 0.665*** 0.606*** 0.620*** 0.573*** 0.573*** 
 (0.060) (0.063) (0.078) (0.076) (0.064) (0.064) 
lnreserves -0.048 -0.041   0.081 0.087 
 (0.096) (0.098)   (0.090) (0.090) 
privcredit_gdp -0.007** -0.007** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.006* -0.006* 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
gdpgrowth -0.066 -0.054 -0.125* -0.126* -0.082 -0.081 
 (0.052) (0.055) (0.075) (0.076) (0.055) (0.055) 
infexp_current 0.163***  0.122*** 0.121*** 0.142*** 0.143*** 
 (0.043)  (0.040) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) 
vix -0.012 -0.004 -0.018 -0.017 -0.020 -0.019 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) 
kaopen -0.079 -0.220 -0.265* -0.226*   
 (0.124) (0.138) (0.138) (0.137)   
findev -0.797 -1.599* 1.378* 0.711 -1.736** -1.873** 
 (0.822) (0.912) (0.775) (0.794) (0.778) (0.772) 
irr_dummy_1 -0.057 -0.406 -0.687 -0.731 0.047 0.118 
 (0.634) (0.677) (0.458) (0.462) (0.594) (0.599) 
publicdebt_gdp -0.001 -0.005 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) 
irr_dummy_1#publicdebt_gdp -0.011 -0.006 0.002 -0.001 -0.012 -0.014* 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) 
st_intrate_US 0.185 0.160 0.131 0.132 0.321** 0.328** 
 (0.146) (0.142) (0.134) (0.134) (0.137) (0.137) 
irr_dummy_1#st_intrate_US -0.066 0.004 0.370** 0.345** 0.024 0.022 
 (0.190) (0.191) (0.161) (0.159) (0.176) (0.176) 
publicdebt_gdp#st_intrate_US 0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
irr_dummy_1#publicdebt_gdp
#st_intrate_US 
0.002 0.001 -0.003 -0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
infexp_previous  -0.121     
  (0.120)     
share_extL_FC   1.703**    
   (0.680)    
extL_DC_gdp    -0.001   
    (0.001)   
extL_FC_gdp    0.003   
    (0.002)   
Ka     -0.704*  
     (0.429)  
Kai      -1.041 
      (0.852) 
Kao      0.162 
      (0.691) 
Constant 3.218** 4.214*** 1.304 2.164** 2.575** 2.543** 
 (1.372) (1.526) (0.935) (1.003) (1.268) (1.266) 
       
Observations 586 585 493 493 537 537 
Countries 53 53 35 35 48 48 
R-squared 0.767 0.747 0.810 0.811 0.787 0.787 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.11. In standard OLS estimations, there are 
three panel error assumptions: groupwise heteroskedasticity, contemporaneous correlation, and serial correlation. 
The PCSE method only corrects for the first two. In the PCSE estimation method, when computing the standard 
errors and the variance-covariance estimates, it is assumed that the disturbances are, by default, heteroskedastic 
and contemporaneously correlated across panels. 
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Table 3: Transmission of short-term rates – all countries, Driscoll-Kraay SE pooled  
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
L.st_intrate 0.613*** 0.707*** 0.665*** 0.674*** 0.631*** 0.630*** 
 (0.058) (0.086) (0.058) (0.056) (0.056) (0.055) 
lnreserves -0.014 -0.014   0.105 0.112 
 (0.095) (0.100)   (0.072) (0.071) 
privcredit_gdp -0.004 -0.004 -0.009 -0.008 -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
gdpgrowth -0.065 -0.059 -0.115 -0.115 -0.085 -0.083 
 (0.092) (0.094) (0.147) (0.149) (0.111) (0.113) 
infexp_current 0.154  0.108 0.108 0.133* 0.133* 
 (0.090)  (0.084) (0.084) (0.076) (0.076) 
vix -0.022 -0.016 -0.024 -0.022 -0.028 -0.027 
 (0.021) (0.028) (0.021) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) 
kaopen -0.054 -0.156 -0.206 -0.178   
 (0.071) (0.119) (0.145) (0.131)   
findev -0.806 -1.444*** 1.122* 0.625 -1.705** -1.855** 
 (0.697) (0.438) (0.654) (0.441) (0.754) (0.688) 
irr_dummy_1 0.042 -0.286 -0.765* -0.805** 0.015 0.093 
 (0.386) (0.529) (0.363) (0.373) (0.277) (0.316) 
publicdebt_gdp -0.001 -0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
irr_dummy_1#publicdebt_gdp -0.010 -0.006 0.002 0.000 -0.011 -0.012 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
st_intrate_US 0.207** 0.186 0.108 0.111 0.338*** 0.347*** 
 (0.091) (0.118) (0.112) (0.106) (0.051) (0.048) 
irr_dummy_1#st_intrate_US -0.112 -0.032 0.373*** 0.351*** -0.001 -0.003 
 (0.097) (0.139) (0.112) (0.096) (0.086) (0.087) 
publicdebt_gdp#st_intrate_US -0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.003*** -0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
irr_dummy_1#publicdebt_gdp
#st_intrate_US 
0.003** 0.002 -0.003** -0.002** 0.003 0.003 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
infexp_previous  -0.052     
  (0.094)     
share_extL_FC   1.220    
   (0.735)    
extL_DC_gdp    -0.000   
    (0.000)   
extL_FC_gdp    0.002*   
    (0.001)   
ka     -0.656***  
     (0.210)  
kai      -1.070 
      (0.616) 
kao      0.223 
      (0.582) 
Constant 2.458 3.243 1.296 1.919 2.006 1.954 
 (2.016) (1.999) (1.095) (1.355) (1.754) (1.740) 
       
Observations 586 585 493 493 537 537 
Countries 53 53 35 35 48 48 
R-squared 0.827 0.811 0.852 0.851 0.837 0.837 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.11.  In the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) robust 
estimation the error structure is assumed to be heteroskedastic, autocorrelated up to some lag (in this case 2 years), and 
possibly correlated between the groups (panels). Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are robust to very general forms of 
cross-sectional ("spatial") and temporal dependence when the time dimension becomes large. This nonparametric 
technique of estimating standard errors does not place any restrictions on the limiting behavior of the number of panels. 
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Table 4: Estimation of regression 1 with alternative estimators, by income group 
 
VARIABLES OLS-AE OLS-DEV PCSE-AE PCSE-DEV DCSE-AE DCSE-DEV 
       
L.fidr_2017_apr 0.651*** 0.591*** 0.593*** 0.504*** 0.651*** 0.591*** 
 (0.058) (0.073) (0.044) (0.068) (0.059) (0.059) 
lnreserves 0.005 0.067 0.018 0.015 0.005 0.067 
 (0.048) (0.137) (0.056) (0.170) (0.039) (0.161) 
privcredit_gdp 0.003 -0.013 0.003 -0.023** 0.003* -0.013 
 (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.010) (0.001) (0.008) 
gdpgrowth 0.118*** -0.171 0.132*** -0.173** 0.118*** -0.171 
 (0.027) (0.114) (0.026) (0.073) (0.030) (0.134) 
infexp_current 0.153*** 0.145 0.179*** 0.152*** 0.153** 0.145 
 (0.049) (0.107) (0.049) (0.044) (0.066) (0.100) 
vix 0.015 -0.042 0.025** -0.027 0.015 -0.042 
 (0.012) (0.034) (0.011) (0.038) (0.016) (0.042) 
kaopen 0.086 -0.150 0.082 -0.181 0.086 -0.150 
 (0.090) (0.168) (0.098) (0.185) (0.084) (0.152) 
findev 0.484 -1.529 0.394 -0.355 0.484 -1.529 
 (0.516) (2.256) (0.592) (2.603) (0.460) (3.231) 
irr_dummy_1 -0.248 2.371* -0.206 2.032 -0.248 2.371** 
 (0.443) (1.383) (0.457) (1.427) (0.317) (1.010) 
publicdebt_gdp -0.002 0.010 -0.003 0.008 -0.002 0.010 
 (0.003) (0.017) (0.003) (0.016) (0.002) (0.008) 
irr_dummy_1#publicdebt_gdp 0.007 -0.068** 0.007 -0.059* 0.007 -0.068** 
 (0.006) (0.034) (0.006) (0.030) (0.004) (0.027) 
st_intrate_US 0.340*** 0.213 0.364*** 0.141 0.340*** 0.213 
 (0.092) (0.325) (0.088) (0.286) (0.065) (0.174) 
irr_dummy_1#st_intrate_US 0.039 -0.890* 0.009 -0.763* 0.039 -0.890*** 
 (0.127) (0.461) (0.133) (0.400) (0.098) (0.223) 
publicdebt_gdp#st_intrate_US -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001* -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.005) (0.000) (0.003) 
irr_dummy_1#publicdebt_gdp#st_int
rate_US 
-0.001 0.022** -0.001 0.019** -0.001 0.022*** 
 (0.002) (0.011) (0.002) (0.008) (0.001) (0.005) 
Constant -1.581** 3.450* -1.796** 4.441** -1.581*** 3.450 
 (0.614) (1.777) (0.709) (2.152) (0.421) (2.166) 
       
Observations 303 283 303 283 303 283 
R-squared 0.777 0.798 0.742 0.724 0.777 0.798 
Countries 26 27 26 27 26 27 




Table 5: Transmission of long-term rates – Advanced Economies,  
OLS pooled with robust SE 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
L.bond_yields 0.638*** 0.660*** 0.538*** 0.548*** 0.778*** 0.789*** 
 (0.094) (0.096) (0.196) (0.191) (0.045) (0.044) 
Lnreserves -0.198*** -0.158**   -0.170*** -0.204*** 
 (0.061) (0.064)   (0.055) (0.066) 
privcredit_gdp 0.003* 0.004** 0.005* 0.004 0.004** 0.005*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) 
gdpgrowth -0.132* -0.109* -0.064 -0.066 -0.064 -0.068 
 (0.071) (0.058) (0.052) (0.049) (0.062) (0.062) 
infexp_current 0.077  0.109 0.102 0.012 0.016 
 (0.054)  (0.089) (0.091) (0.034) (0.031) 
vix 0.001 0.003 0.015 0.015 0.003 0.003 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
kaopen -0.034 0.014 -0.463** -0.555**   
 (0.165) (0.181) (0.207) (0.242)   
findev -0.926 -0.680 -1.638*** -1.804*** -0.624 -0.684 
 (0.625) (0.545) (0.616) (0.678) (0.573) (0.578) 
irr_dummy_1 -2.206 -1.842 -4.573*** -4.338*** -3.472** -3.299** 
 (2.069) (2.005) (1.606) (1.514) (1.613) (1.599) 
lt_intrate_US 0.692*** 0.647*** 0.637*** 0.651*** 0.470*** 0.485*** 
 (0.207) (0.201) (0.137) (0.144) (0.143) (0.141) 
irr_dummy_1#lt_intrate_US 0.342 0.287 0.891** 0.832** 0.612* 0.590* 
 (0.428) (0.415) (0.366) (0.347) (0.335) (0.333) 
publicdebt_gdp 0.007 0.008 0.006* 0.006** 0.003 0.005 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.007) 
irr_dummy_1#publicdebt_gdp 0.025 0.023 0.070*** 0.067*** 0.043** 0.038* 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.020) (0.020) 
lt_intrate_US#publicdebt_gdp -0.003 -0.003 -0.003** -0.003** -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
irr_dummy_1#lt_intrate_US#p
ublicdebt_gdp 
-0.004 -0.004 -0.013** -0.012** -0.008* -0.007* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
infexp_previous  0.228**     
  (0.111)     
share_extL_FC   0.884    
   (0.585)    
extL_DC_gdp    -0.001   
    (0.001)   
extL_FC_gdp    0.002*   
    (0.001)   
ka     -0.389  
     (0.590)  
kai      -1.522* 
      (0.862) 
kao      0.397 
      (0.288) 
Constant 1.460 0.267 0.494 1.037 1.055 1.296 
 (1.300) (1.189) (0.886) (1.080) (1.555) (1.576) 
       
Observations 293 293 310 310 275 275 
Countries 26 26 22 22 24 24 
R-squared 0.725 0.736 0.733 0.733 0.816 0.819 





Table 6: Transmission of long term rates – Advanced Economies, PCSE pooled 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
L.bond_yields 0.620*** 0.658*** 0.378*** 0.400*** 0.761*** 0.780*** 
 (0.079) (0.074) (0.110) (0.107) (0.065) (0.064) 
Lnreserves -0.205*** -0.159***   -0.181*** -0.210*** 
 (0.061) (0.059)   (0.055) (0.058) 
privcredit_gdp 0.004 0.004** 0.005* 0.004* 0.004** 0.005** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
gdpgrowth -0.134*** -0.109*** -0.045 -0.046 -0.061* -0.066** 
 (0.036) (0.034) (0.040) (0.040) (0.032) (0.032) 
infexp_current 0.074  0.100 0.091 0.007 0.012 
 (0.057)  (0.070) (0.071) (0.060) (0.058) 
vix 0.001 0.003 0.023* 0.022* 0.004 0.003 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) 
kaopen -0.052 0.012 -0.574* -0.693**   
 (0.152) (0.150) (0.304) (0.345)   
findev -0.942 -0.682 -2.000*** -2.182*** -0.629 -0.684 
 (0.606) (0.557) (0.765) (0.799) (0.629) (0.606) 
irr_dummy_1 -2.291 -1.850 -5.567*** -5.201*** -3.643*** -3.407*** 
 (1.445) (1.391) (1.367) (1.339) (1.073) (1.060) 
lt_intrate_US 0.703*** 0.648*** 0.725*** 0.737*** 0.472*** 0.485*** 
 (0.173) (0.164) (0.122) (0.123) (0.154) (0.151) 
irr_dummy_1#lt_intrate_US 0.354 0.288 1.102*** 1.016*** 0.639*** 0.607** 
 (0.316) (0.303) (0.315) (0.305) (0.239) (0.236) 
publicdebt_gdp 0.007 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.003 0.005 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) 
irr_dummy_1#publicdebt_gdp 0.026 0.023 0.087*** 0.083*** 0.044*** 0.039*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.020) (0.019) (0.013) (0.013) 
lt_intrate_US#publicdebt_gdp -0.003 -0.003 -0.004** -0.004*** -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
irr_dummy_1#lt_intrate_US#pu
blicdebt_gdp 
-0.004 -0.004 -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.008*** -0.007** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
infexp_previous  0.229***     
  (0.072)     
share_extL_FC   1.368*    
   (0.834)    
extL_DC_gdp    -0.001*   
    (0.001)   
extL_FC_gdp    0.003*   
    (0.002)   
Ka     -0.426  
     (0.515)  
kai      -1.491* 
      (0.771) 
Kao      0.367 
      (0.314) 
Constant 1.641 0.285 0.991 1.753* 1.228 1.392 
 (1.145) (1.140) (0.890) (1.092) (1.131) (1.116) 
       
Observations 293 293 310 310 275 275 
R-squared 0.712 0.734 0.636 0.641 0.801 0.811 
Countries 26 26 22 22 24 24 





Table 7: Transmission of long term rates – Advanced Economies, Driscoll-Kraay SE pooled 
  
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
L.bond_yields 0.638*** 0.660*** 0.538*** 0.548*** 0.778*** 0.789*** 
 (0.073) (0.054) (0.150) (0.152) (0.026) (0.021) 
lnreserves -0.198** -0.158*   -0.170** -0.204** 
 (0.071) (0.076)   (0.068) (0.084) 
privcredit_gdp 0.003* 0.004** 0.005 0.004 0.004** 0.005** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) 
gdpgrowth -0.132** -0.109** -0.064 -0.066 -0.064* -0.068* 
 (0.058) (0.038) (0.050) (0.046) (0.035) (0.037) 
infexp_current 0.077*  0.109** 0.102* 0.012 0.016 
 (0.039)  (0.047) (0.049) (0.033) (0.033) 
vix 0.001 0.003 0.015 0.015 0.003 0.003 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) 
kaopen -0.034 0.014 -0.463* -0.555*   
 (0.140) (0.139) (0.248) (0.290)   
findev -0.926 -0.680 -1.638 -1.804 -0.624 -0.684 
 (0.761) (0.600) (1.374) (1.398) (0.648) (0.654) 
irr_dummy_1 -2.206* -1.842 -4.573** -4.338** -3.472** -3.299** 
 (1.238) (1.341) (1.571) (1.496) (1.332) (1.275) 
publicdebt_gdp 0.007 0.008 0.006** 0.006** 0.003 0.005 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) 
irr_dummy_1#publicdebt_gdp 0.025 0.023 0.070*** 0.067** 0.043* 0.038* 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.023) (0.023) (0.019) (0.019) 
lt_intrate_US 0.692*** 0.647*** 0.637*** 0.651*** 0.470*** 0.485*** 
 (0.100) (0.084) (0.160) (0.157) (0.093) (0.089) 
irr_dummy_1#lt_intrate_US 0.342 0.287 0.891** 0.832** 0.612** 0.590** 
 (0.226) (0.248) (0.303) (0.293) (0.268) (0.263) 
publicdebt_gdp#lt_intrate_US -0.003** -0.003* -0.003** -0.003** -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
irr_dummy_1#publicdebt_gdp#lt_i
ntrate_US 
-0.004 -0.004 -0.013*** -0.012** -0.008* -0.007* 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
infexp_previous  0.228*     
  (0.130)     
share_extL_FC   0.884*    
   (0.513)    
extL_DC_gdp    -0.001   
    (0.001)   
extL_FC_gdp    0.002   
    (0.001)   
ka     -0.389  
     (0.850)  
kai      -1.522 
      (1.047) 
Kao      0.397 
      (0.358) 
Constant 1.460 0.267 0.494 1.037 1.055 1.296 
 (1.152) (1.119) (0.850) (1.114) (1.723) (1.774) 
       
Observations 293 293 310 310 275 275 
R-squared 0.725 0.736 0.733 0.733 0.816 0.819 
Countries 26 26 22 22 24 24 




Table 8: Transmission of long-term rates – Emerging Markets - OLS pooled with robust SE 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
L.lnembi 0.669*** 0.685*** 0.708*** 0.704*** 0.659*** 0.658*** 
 (0.044) (0.047) (0.045) (0.046) (0.044) (0.044) 
lnreserves -0.007 -0.001   -0.013 -0.012 
 (0.026) (0.027)   (0.025) (0.026) 
privcredit_gdp -0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
gdpgrowth -0.016*** -0.018*** -0.016** -0.015** -0.015*** -0.015*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) 
infexp_current 0.012***  0.010*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
 (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
vix 0.034*** 0.035*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
kaopen -0.006 -0.019 -0.015 -0.021   
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.027)   
findev -0.437 -0.480* -0.078 -0.182 -0.350 -0.362 
 (0.275) (0.290) (0.282) (0.265) (0.277) (0.282) 
irr_dummy_1 1.014 1.077 -0.981 -1.127 1.549* 1.550* 
 (0.937) (1.049) (1.350) (1.384) (0.822) (0.823) 
lt_intrate_US 0.078 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 0.080 0.082 
 (0.069) (0.086) (0.039) (0.042) (0.069) (0.072) 
irr_dummy_1#lt_intrate_US -0.247 -0.244 0.160 0.183 -0.343** -0.345** 
 (0.190) (0.215) (0.264) (0.273) (0.168) (0.170) 
publicdebt_gdp 0.001 -0.008 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) 
irr_dummy_1#publicdebt_gdp -0.021 -0.019 0.016 0.019 -0.033* -0.033* 
 (0.022) (0.025) (0.035) (0.037) (0.017) (0.018) 
lt_intrate_US#publicdebt_gdp -0.000 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
irr_dummy_1#lt_intrate_US#pu
blicdebt_gdp 
0.005 0.004 -0.003 -0.003 0.008** 0.008** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) 
infexp_previous  0.005     
  (0.003)     
share_extL_FC   0.456*    
   (0.271)    
extL_DC_gdp    -0.002   
    (0.001)   
extL_FC_gdp    0.004*   
    (0.002)   
ka     0.032  
     (0.086)  
kai      -0.013 
      (0.149) 
kao      0.042 
      (0.125) 
Constant 0.942* 1.169* 0.868** 1.108*** 0.966* 0.955* 
 (0.553) (0.607) (0.427) (0.376) (0.531) (0.549) 
       
Observations 207 207 182 182 194 194 
R-squared 0.871 0.860 0.854 0.853 0.881 0.881 




Table 9: Transmission of long-term rates – Emerging Markets - PCSE pooled method 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
L.lnembi 0.577*** 0.611*** 0.631*** 0.627*** 0.564*** 0.563*** 
 (0.045) (0.048) (0.047) (0.046) (0.045) (0.045) 
Lnreserves -0.018 -0.009   -0.024 -0.023 
 (0.030) (0.031)   (0.032) (0.032) 
privcredit_gdp -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
gdpgrowth -0.014** -0.016** -0.015** -0.014** -0.013** -0.013** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) 
infexp_current 0.013***  0.011*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 
 (0.002)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
vix 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
kaopen -0.019 -0.034 -0.027 -0.034   
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.027)   
findev -0.626* -0.663* -0.144 -0.244 -0.551 -0.562 
 (0.366) (0.357) (0.311) (0.332) (0.378) (0.382) 
irr_dummy_1 0.457 0.596 -1.095 -1.208 1.210 1.214 
 (0.861) (0.945) (2.439) (2.452) (0.833) (0.838) 
lt_intrate_US 0.066 -0.031 -0.025 -0.025 0.069 0.071 
 (0.084) (0.090) (0.054) (0.055) (0.084) (0.084) 
irr_dummy_1#lt_intrate_US -0.133 -0.143 0.172 0.188 -0.272 -0.274 
 (0.188) (0.207) (0.508) (0.511) (0.183) (0.185) 
publicdebt_gdp -0.001 -0.011 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) 
irr_dummy_1#publicdebt_gd
p 
-0.010 -0.009 0.012 0.014 -0.027 -0.027 
 (0.020) (0.022) (0.070) (0.071) (0.019) (0.019) 
lt_intrate_US#publicdebt_gd
p 
0.000 0.003 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
irr_dummy_1#lt_intrate_US#
publicdebt_gdp 
0.003 0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.006 0.007 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.015) (0.015) (0.004) (0.004) 
infexp_previous  0.004     
  (0.003)     
share_extL_FC   0.579**    
   (0.282)    
extL_DC_gdp    -0.002   
    (0.002)   
extL_FC_gdp    0.005*   
    (0.002)   
ka     0.073  
     (0.103)  
kai      0.008 
      (0.154) 
kao      0.062 
      (0.143) 
Constant 1.558** 1.731** 1.297*** 1.577*** 1.556** 1.555** 
 (0.653) (0.691) (0.436) (0.417) (0.628) (0.628) 
       
Observations 207 207 182 182 194 194 
R-squared 0.898 0.881 0.866 0.865 0.908 0.908 
Countries 22 22 14 14 20 20 




Table 10: Transmission of long-term rates – Emerging Markets - Driscoll-Kraay SE pooled  
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
L.lnembi 0.669*** 0.685*** 0.708*** 0.704*** 0.659*** 0.658*** 
 (0.112) (0.113) (0.094) (0.100) (0.108) (0.108) 
lnreserves -0.007 -0.001   -0.013 -0.012 
 (0.019) (0.019)   (0.016) (0.018) 
privcredit_gdp -0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
gdpgrowth -0.016* -0.018* -0.016 -0.015 -0.015* -0.015* 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) 
infexp_current 0.012***  0.010** 0.010** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
 (0.003)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
vix 0.034** 0.035** 0.025*** 0.025** 0.037*** 0.037*** 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012) 
kaopen -0.006 -0.019 -0.015 -0.021   
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.012) (0.015)   
findev -0.437 -0.480 -0.078 -0.182 -0.350 -0.362 
 (0.283) (0.315) (0.323) (0.305) (0.272) (0.288) 
1.irr_dummy_1 1.014* 1.077 -0.981 -1.127 1.549** 1.550** 
 (0.546) (0.815) (1.000) (0.996) (0.627) (0.643) 
lt_intrate_US 0.078 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 0.080 0.082 
 (0.096) (0.121) (0.037) (0.031) (0.095) (0.093) 
1.irr_dummy_1#c.lt_intrate_US -0.247* -0.244 0.160 0.183 -0.343** -0.345** 
 (0.120) (0.175) (0.203) (0.201) (0.132) (0.136) 
publicdebt_gdp 0.001 -0.008 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
1.irr_dummy_1#c.publicdebt_gd
p 
-0.021 -0.019 0.016 0.019 -0.033** -0.033** 
 (0.016) (0.021) (0.028) (0.028) (0.014) (0.014) 
c.lt_intrate_US#c.publicdebt_gd
p 
-0.000 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
1.irr_dummy_1#c.lt_intrate_US#
c.publicdebt_gdp 
0.005 0.004 -0.003 -0.003 0.008** 0.008** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) 
infexp_previous  0.005     
  (0.003)     
share_extL_FC   0.456*    
   (0.224)    
extL_DC_gdp    -0.002   
    (0.001)   
extL_FC_gdp    0.004   
    (0.002)   
Ka     0.032  
     (0.050)  
kai      -0.013 
      (0.086) 
kao      0.042 
      (0.037) 
Constant 0.942* 1.169* 0.868** 1.108** 0.966** 0.955** 
 (0.517) (0.561) (0.399) (0.450) (0.423) (0.409) 
       
Observations 207 207 182 182 194 194 
R-squared 0.871 0.860 0.854 0.853 0.881 0.881 
Countries 22 22 14 14 20 20 




Table 11: Marginal effects of government debt-to-GDP ratio on the transmission of US long-
term interest rates to advanced economies 
 
 
Tab. 5, reg. 3 Tab. 5, reg. 4 Tab. 6, reg. 3 Tab. 6, reg. 4 
 Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
debt-to-GDP 
ratio (%) 
-0.003** (0.001) -0.003** (0.001) -0.004** (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) 
dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. 
0 1.160*** (0.278) 1.139*** (0.269) 1.372*** (0.226) 1.333*** 0.223 
20 0.950*** (0.216) 0.936*** (0.210) 1.114*** (0.173) 1.085*** 0.171 
40 0.741*** (0.159) 0.734*** (0.156) 0.856*** (0.125) 0.837*** 0.123 
60 0.531*** (0.110) 0.531*** (0.112) 0.598*** (0.087) 0.589*** 0.088 
80 0.322*** (0.088) 0.328*** (0.095) 0.340*** (0.077) 0.341*** 0.080 
100 0.112 (0.109) 0.125 (0.117) 0.082 (0.103) 0.093 0.108 
120 -0.098 (0.157) -0.077 (0.164) -0.176 (0.148) -0.155 0.152 
140 -0.307 (0.214) -0.280 (0.219) -0.434** (0.199) -0.403** 0.203 
160 -0.517* (0.275) -0.483* (0.279) -0.692*** (0.252) -0.651** 0.256 
180 -0.726** (0.338) -0.686** (0.340) -0.950*** (0.307) -0.899*** 0.310 
200 -0.936** (0.401) -0.888** (0.402) -1.209*** (0.362) -1.147*** 0.365 





Appendix - variables and data sources 
 
Variable Definition and source 
st_intrate Short-term Interest Rate from World Economic Outlook database, Apr 2017 
edition. 
st_intrate_US 
Short-term Interest Rate in the U.S. Source: World Economic Outlook database, 
Apr 2017 edition. 
bond_yields 
10-year bond yields from (FIGB_PA variable) from International Financial 
Statistics database 
lt_intrate_US 
10-year bond yields in the U.S. (FIGB_PA variable) from International Financial 
Statistics database 
lnembi Natural logarithm of JP Morgan emerging market bond index (EMBI). 
Lnreserves 
Natural logarithm of foreign exchange reserves minus gold, millions of current 
USD. Source: External Wealth of Nations Mark II database, as updated until 2015 
in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2017).  
privcredit_gdp 
Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP). Source: Global Financial 
Development Database, July 2018 edition. 
Gdpgrowth 
Real GDP Growth Rate in period t (%). Source: World Economic Outlook 
database, Apr 2017 edition. 
infexp_current 
Inflation (CPI) Forecast in Current (April) edition of the World Economic Outlook 
database, Apr 2017 edition. 
infexp_previous 
Inflation (CPI) Forecast in Previous year’s (April) edition of the World Economic 
Outlook database, Apr 2017 edition. 
vix VIX index by Chicago Board of Exchange. Source: Bloomberg. 
kaopen 
Value of Chinn and Ito (2006) index from their updated database available at: 
http://web.pdx.edu/~ito/Chinn-Ito_website.htm. 
findev Financial development indicator from Svirydzenka (2016). 
irr_dummy_1 
Dummy for fixed exchange rate regime (value of 1 according to the “coarse” 
classification) from Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff (2018). 
publicdebt_gdp 
General government debt as % of GDP. Source: World Economic Outlook 
database, Apr 2017 edition. 
share_extL_FC Share of external liabilities in foreign currency. Source: Bénétrix et al. (2019). 
extL_DC_gdp 
Relation of external liabilities denominated in foreign currency to GDP. Source: 
Bénétrix et al. (2019). 
extL_FC_gdp 
Relation of external liabilities denominated in domestic currency to GDP. Source: 
Bénétrix et al. (2019). 
Ka 
Capital controls – overall restrictions index, all asset categories. Source: 
Fernández et al. (2016) 
Kai Capital controls – overall inflow restrictions index (Fernández et al. 2016). 
Kao Capital controls - overall outflow restrictions index (Fernández et al. 2016). 
 
